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Abstract. Evaluation is usually an internalized process that is intrinsic to the activities 
of market actors. Producers evaluate what goods to produce, intermediaries such as 
distributors and retailers evaluate what goods to promote and stock, while consumers 
evaluate what goods to buy. In some cases, however, a secondary evaluation market 
controlled by an external evaluator can emerge as a de-facto gatekeeper exerting a 
powerful influence over the activities of market actors in the primary market. This 
article develops a conceptual model of external evaluation that describes: (i) the fac-
tors common to primary markets that are dominated by evaluation markets; (ii) the 
characteristics common to dominant evaluators and their evaluation markets; and 
(iii) the dynamic processes through which an evaluator can become entrenched in a 
position of dominance over other market actors. This conceptual model is illustrated 
through examples drawn from three dominant evaluators and the markets they domi-
nate. Key Words • cultural goods • external evaluation • league tables • product evaluation • rankings • selection systems
Introduction
Evaluation is a psychological process that is ubiquitous but little studied. We con-
stantly evaluate our environment and ourselves in order to determine our own 
behaviours. The spectrum of evaluative behaviours in which we regularly engage 
is very broad, and it is particularly important as a process that is intrinsic to the 
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functioning of markets, especially when goods and services are of varying qual-
ity. Producers must internally evaluate what products or services to produce and 
promote in the market. Intermediaries such as distributors, agents and retailers 
evaluate which producer offerings to stock and support through their distribu-
tion networks. Consumers use evaluative routines to make purchase decisions on 
a range of choices.
Although evaluation is a process that occurs at all levels in all markets, the 
capacity to evaluate is not heterogeneous across market actors, and can be con-
centrated in: (a) the producer in the case of a market monopoly (e.g. Microsoft); 
(b) the buyer in a monopsonistic market (e.g. defence contractors selling to the 
government); and (c) market intermediaries (e.g. supermarket chains such as 
Walmart and Tesco). Under certain conditions, however, the capacity to evaluate 
can become concentrated in the hands of an actor that is external to the primary 
evaluator – due to a scarcity of information required by other market actors in 
their evaluative routines. In certain cases, these third party evaluators can become 
powerful to the point where they are able to monopolize the information required 
for the efficient functioning of markets and thereby influence the behaviour of 
other market actors. These dominant external evaluators and their systems of 
evaluation are becoming increasingly pervasive in both private and public sec-
tors, as their judgements become instrumental tools of an ‘audit society’ (Power, 
1997). Given the consequences of this dominance upon broader social issues such 
as market power and consumer choice, the purpose of this article is to theorize 
the role of these dominant external evaluators. Although many external evaluators 
are influential to some extent or another, in this paper we intentionally focus on 
the in-depth study of three dominant evaluators because of the ability of ‘extreme’ 
cases to bring about insights into underlying causal mechanisms and processes 
(Starbuck, 1993) that enable and constrain the relative influence of evaluators in 
general. These cases are: (i) Robert Parker Jr and the market for fine Bordeaux 
wines; (ii) the Michelin Guide rouge and French haute cuisine restaurants; and (iii) 
the FT MBA 100 Rankings and European MBA programmes.
Three perspectives on evaluation systems can be identified from the extant liter-
ature: quantitative, structural and cultural. Quantitative studies have examined the 
correlation between positive and negative reviews and demand, pricing, supply 
and other underlying characteristics of diverse goods such as movies (Basuroy et 
al., 2003; Boatwright et al., 2007), restaurants (Chossat and Gergaud, 2003), degree 
programmes (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999), used cars (Hollenbacher and Yerger, 
2001) and financial securities (Zuckerman, 1999). Although this research provides 
us some insight into the extent of an evaluator’s influence and their evaluative 
methodologies, we must look elsewhere for explanations as to how this influence 
can evolve into market dominance.
Selection systems research takes a structural approach by examining how relative 
value is determined in various types of competitive market contexts. Several ideal 
types have been proposed: market, peer, and expert selection systems (Debackere 
et al., 1994; Wijnberg, 1995). These systems differ in terms of which group holds 
the primary influence over the selection process in a given field. In market systems 
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for example, aggregate consumer demand is the major determinant (e.g. consumer 
goods), while in peer systems, the market participants themselves are involved in 
the process of determining relative value (e.g. peer reviewed academic journals). 
Expert systems, fields where cognate experts control the selection process, tend to 
be dominant in the arts, the sciences and related technical and creative industries, 
due to the paradigmatic nature of change and the way in which innovation is val-
ued in these fields (Wijnberg and Gemser, 2000; Wijnberg, 2004).
The explanatory weight given to rational choice, however, gives inadequate 
attention to the importance of factors such as rank and status (Podolny, 1993, 
2001) and other cultural logics in explaining how expert evaluators can become 
dominant. A number of studies from the cultural perspective examine the role of 
such factors as identity, legitimacy, norms, values and other institutional forces 
in guiding the formation and evolution of complex and contested fields or mar-
kets where external evaluators often play a gate-keeping role (e.g. Rao et al., 2003; 
Durand et al., 2007). While the role of these isomorphic pressures is helpful in 
illuminating aspects of the ‘cat and mouse’ game that is played out between the 
evaluator and the evaluated producers (Corley and Gioia, 2000; Martins, 2005; 
Wedlin, 2006, 2007), discussions of how material interests such as economic gain 
figure in the calculus of market actors are downplayed.
Building upon these three approaches, we suggest that their explanatory 
strengths can be synthesized to counter their respective weaknesses to create a bal-
anced perspective that provides insight into the following research questions:
(1) What are the characteristics of markets that lead to the dominance of power-
ful external evaluators?
(2) What is the nature of the processes through which this dominance emerges 
and is entrenched?
Accordingly, this paper consists of five sections in which we systematically develop 
a general conceptual framework for evaluators. We first set out the parameters 
of the universal evaluation process and the generic role that evaluators can, in 
 principle, play in the process. Next, we examine the characteristics of primary 
markets that are dominated by powerful external evaluators. After this, we look 
at the salient characteristics of dominant evaluators and their evaluation markets. 
Following this, we explore the processes by which markets come to be dominated 
by powerful evaluators. We conclude with a discussion of how these various char-
acteristics can reinforce or mitigate the power of evaluators, and the implications 
for future research.
The parameters of evaluating
When consumers seek to buy a product it is assumed that they go through a pro-
cess of evaluation. For impulse purchases, habit or heuristics might determine the 
outcome. For example in the latter case, Gigerenzer et al. suggest that in a situation 
where little is known about the options available, the heuristic ‘Go with what you 




know’ is often employed (Gigerenzer et al., 1998). In the former case, Ehrenberg 
demonstrated that multi-brand buying is the norm and this can be explained by, 
for example, variety-seeking behaviour and product availability (Ehrenberg and 
Goodhardt, 1970). For more considered purchases it is often assumed that some 
form of multi-attribute purchasing model is used. This involves the potential pur-
chaser deciding which product attributes should be considered as important in the 
performance of the product, what weight to give to each attribute and then esti-
mating the likely performance of each possible purchase option on those dimen-
sions. The underlying decision model is essentially linear additive, such that the 
total score for a purchase option is given by the score on a particular dimension 
weighted by its attribute score and then added to all the scores across all the other 
dimensions. The product with the highest scored purchase option is the one that 
is purchased.
However, such a model implies modes of thought that are not necessarily regu-
larly employed by consumers or indeed any actors in any sphere where decision 
making involving choice among alternatives is required. There is a long history 
of attempts to model these kinds of decisions, albeit often obliquely. One of the 
first multi-attribute models was suggested by Fishbein to model the relationship 
between beliefs and attitudes (1963). This model was further developed by Ajzen 
and Fishbein in their theory of reasoned action (TRA), which modelled the rela-
tionships between attitudes and self-evaluated likelihoods of a particular purchase 
choice (1980).
This further developed into the theory of planned behaviour (TPB), accord-
ing to which consumers are said to act in accordance with their intentions to buy 
and their perceptions over controls over their possible behaviours (Ajzen, 1991). 
Meta-analyses of many studies suggested that around 30 per cent of variance in 
ultimate purchase behaviour could be explained by TPB. Most recently, Richetin et 
al. have conducted studies that used models of goal directed behaviour (MGB) and 
extended goal directed behaviour (EMGB), which added affective, motivation, and 
automatic processes to the mix of variables already considered (2008). However, 
while relationships among the non-behavioural variables were strong, that was 
not true for the behaviour, where for example, the ‘amount drunk’ of a fizzy drink 
explained only 6 per cent of the variance. This follows the general trend, indicating 
that there are many reasons why what we think doesn’t necessarily reflect how we 
behave. The number of possible intervening variables is legion and their impacts 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess.
One of the important issues is cognitive competence. Even when given a matrix 
which represents the basic structure of a multi-attribute model such as those 
described above, respondents rarely employ a linear additive model; they use sim-
ple models such as the compensatory additive rule, or non-compensatory rules 
such as lexicographic and ‘elimination by aspects’ rules (Park, 1976). In essence 
some of the data are ignored either because the linear additive model does not cor-
respond to the model consumers normally use or because they cannot or will not 
do the necessary calculations.
What this very brief review suggests is that the process of evaluation is cogni-
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tively difficult, strongly influenced by environmental factors and varies from indi-
vidual to individual. It is therefore not surprising that consumers will often rely on 
others – evaluators of one kind or another – to help them make the consumption 
choices.
An evaluator can suggest what should be the list of factors to be taken into con-
sideration; for example, for a film, the plot, camera work, actors, length, genre, etc. 
Moreover they can also suggest, albeit often unconsciously, what the weighting of 
the factors should be (for example, plot is far more important than camerawork). 
This is a useful set of data to have to make a decision but the evaluator can go a step 
 further and provide a recommendation based on a metric (four stars) or a qualita-
tive statement (go and see the movie if you have nothing else to do). They don’t do 
the math either, but most probably base their judgements on a template of factors, 
weighted by their own values and applied to many examples of evaluating similar 
products. If the consumer wishes to accept the evaluator’s evaluation they should 
realize that they are not only agreeing to the judgements about the factors but also 
to the values the evaluator is placing on them.
Primary market characteristics
Markets with dominant evaluators tend to have common characteristics related 
to: the nature of the goods exchanged; the relative experience of consumers; and a 
lack of informational cues. While none of these factors in themselves guarantee the 
emergence of evaluators, in combination, these factors can become self-reinforcing 
to create a nascent demand for evaluative judgements.
Nature of goods exchanged
Evaluator dominated markets tend to be based on goods and services that are 
experiential, high involvement and cultural in nature.
Experiential Experience goods and services cannot be ‘discovered’ during the 
search process (Nelson, 1970, 1974) and thus require post hoc experience in 
order to be adequately assessed (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982; Holbrook and 
Hirschman, 1982). In other words, these products and services are highly complex 
and variable in terms of offering and quality such that they defy judgement based 
on prima facie inspection. Ultimately the quality of a restaurant meal, a movie 
or a holiday, for example, can only be adequately judged through the experience 
of consumption. As we discuss later, however, the greater the consumer’s experi-
ence, the less of an issue this becomes, because of their ability to extrapolate from 
past experiences. Some cases, such as an MBA programme, are highly complex 
experiences where prospective buyers have no directly comparable experiences to 
draw upon. Students’ perceptions are formed through countless encounters with 
lecturers, administrative staff, classmates, alumni and others such that no two stu-
dents can have quite the same experience. Furthermore, the benefit of a degree 




can be measured on many dimensions including: employment attained, scholastic 
achievement and access to social and professional networks.
High involvement Laurent and Kapferer (1985) describe goods where consumers 
tend to be more highly involved by having a greater ‘stake’ in the purchase outcome 
in terms of performance (e.g. functionality, durability, hedonic pleasure, etc.) and 
psychological risk (e.g. social status, uncertainty, emotional distress, etc.). In mass 
consumer markets (e.g. movies, books, automobiles) where there is a wide range 
of offering in terms of price and quality, external evaluation tends to be targeted at 
those buyers who seek more discerning judgements – arguably because of what is 
at stake in terms of the consequences of making an inappropriate purchase. While 
a ‘bad’ choice in a situation such as a bad movie is a relatively inexpensive mistake 
and quickly forgotten, a high ticket item such as an automobile can have some very 
costly consequences for the consumer. Some purchases, such as an MBA, are only 
made once in a lifetime and involve significant sacrifices in terms of both time and 
money.
Cultural Markets where consumers place a higher value on expert opinion 
because of what is at stake are often inclusive of what are termed cultural goods. 
These goods primarily serve an aesthetic or expressive function, rather than a 
clearly utilitarian function (Hirsch, 1972) and involve human creativity in their 
production, convey multiple symbolic meanings and embody some form of intel-
lectual property (Throsby, 2001). The consumption of cultural goods, such as fine 
wine and haute cuisine meals in sub-markets can serve to enhance an individu-
al’s accumulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) – creating a demand for 
finer judgement that is less prevalent in the broader respective markets of table 
wine and restaurant meals. Boatwright et al. (2007) for example found that criti-
cal evaluations of narrowly targeted platform movies, such as art films, were more 
influential than those of wide release blockbuster type movies. This may explain 
why educational league tables are highly influential but not consistently so across 
the student demographic. For example Asian–American students, students from 
high-income families and students from university educated parents are most 
likely to be influenced by undergraduate league tables (McDonough et al., 1998) 
while other groups, such as students from low-income families, first generation 
college students and non-traditional students tend to pay relatively little attention 
to league tables and guidebooks (Hossler and Foley, 1995).
Experienced buyers
Experienced buyers with significant knowledge and experience tend to have highly 
established evaluation processes and routines for evaluating potential purchases. 
The development of this expertise however tends to be quite difficult and demand-
ing in terms of time and resources. Given the bounded rationality of consumers in 
terms of time, knowledge and other resources (Simon, 1957), in situations where 
they lack specific expertise, there is a tendency, as discussed earlier, for them to 
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rely on relatively simple heuristic models to guide their choices. Individuals tend 
to sequentially evaluate options until a ‘good enough’ alternative is encountered 
and then decided upon. Psychological research on decision making suggests that 
 individuals operating outside their own domain of expertise (i.e. inexperienced 
buyers) tend to experience high levels of anxiety and regret in choosing between 
what they perceive as relatively undifferentiated alternatives. This perception is 
due to a lack of relevant knowledge and understanding (Schwartz, 2004), thereby 
motivating novice buyers to seek recommendations (King and Balasubramanian, 
1994).
Informational cues
Information is crucial to the functioning of markets. If informational cues are not 
readily available, however, buyers can be forced into costly search and experience 
processes (Nelson, 1970). Examples of inadequate cues include: a lack of coverage, 
information bias, and outdated reputations. In rapidly expanding markets, new 
producers on the market periphery often lack the benefit of established reputa-
tions and the resources to advertise extensively in order to provide the signals of 
quality sought by buyers (Nelson, 1974). Even in markets where evaluators already 
exist, their position can be compromised by conflicts of interest due to their eco-
nomic involvement with producers, with the consequence of evaluators producing 
reviews that fail to address the demands of rationally bounded buyers by being 
overly complex or vague. Another information problem occurs when incumbent 
producers ‘coast’ on their reputations, which no longer correlate with the relative 
underlying quality of a producer’s goods (Podolny, 1993).
Robert Parker Jr is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s most influen-
tial wine critics – particularly over the US market for fine Bordeaux red wines 
(Steinberger, 2007) – a market which had been stratified by static and increasingly 
anachronistic classification systems such as the Bordeaux Wine Official Classification 
of 1855 and the 1935 Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée laws which allowed many 
producers to ‘coast’ on their reputations at a time of rapid improvements in qual-
ity by New World producers (Taber, 2005). A positive or negative review of a wine 
by Parker in his newsletter, The Wine Advocate, can result in a financial windfall 
or crisis for its producer – a consequence that has been dubbed by those in the 
wine trade as the ‘Parker Effect’, which Ali and Nuages (2007) estimated for the 
Bordeaux 2003 vintage to be $2.80 per bottle.
The Michelin Red Guide, a series of restaurant guides updated and published 
annually covering 45,000 restaurants and hotels across Europe, has an equally 
powerful influence over the French haute cuisine sector. Gergaud et al. (2007), 
in their analysis of Parisian restaurants, found that appearing in the Michelin Red 
Guide led to a price premium of 9 per cent and the awarding to a restaurant of its 
first star increased menu prices by 27 per cent.
Similarly, the Financial Times (FT), through the FT MBA 100, an annual inter-
national league table or ranking of MBA programmes, has gained the ability to 
exert direct influence over the interests of countless stakeholders of management 




and business schools in Europe. Despite the growing demand for and supply of 
MBA programmes outside of the US, prior to the publication of the first FT MBA 
100 in 1999, few international programmes were ranked, due to their lack of cover-
age by American publications such as BusinessWeek and US News & World Report 
(Bradshaw, 2007). Although the precise extent of the impact of the FT MBA 100, 
as anecdotally reported (Kwon, 2006), has not been empirically verified, a number 
of studies of US business schools and universities have found that a change in 
league table rankings (e.g. BusinessWeek MBA Program Ranking, US News & World 
Report’s College Rankings) can have a significant impact upon: the decision-making 
process of potential students (Hossler and Foley, 1995; McDonough et al., 1998); 
the perceptions of institutional stakeholders (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996); changes 
in admission and tuition fee policies (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999); and in some 
cases, where a drop in rankings is significant enough, acting as a catalyst for sub-
stantive organizational change (Fee et al., 2005; Martins, 2005). The increasing 
influence of league tables on US and European institutions is arguably linked to 
the expansion of the higher education sector which has led to a proliferation of 
both new institutions and students.
Evaluator market characteristics
An evaluator market is a type of secondary market, which is an adjunct to a prima-
ry market such as those described in the previous section (see Figure 1). The main 
function of an evaluator market is the exchange of evaluations of goods or serv-
ices exchanged in the primary market, thus providing evaluations that increase the 
efficiency of the market. Without such evaluations potential customers may not 
have the confidence to buy and markets may stagnate or even disappear. Within 
the context of an evaluator/primary market dyad, the original primary market can 
be conceptualized as a ‘market within a market’. While in the primary market, pro-
ducers, intermediaries and consumers engage in the exchange of a given class of 
goods, in an evaluator market, the evaluator becomes a ‘producer’ of evaluations 
that are the subject of exchange with primary market actors who are ‘consumers’ 
of this evaluation. In some cases, this market dyad can be monopolized by a single 
evaluator, through the introduction of an evaluative innovation. Characteristics 
of these dominant evaluators and their evaluative innovations include: perceived 
specialized expertise; evaluative format and a substantial input/output network.
Specialized expertise
In markets such as those for experiential or cultural goods, where buyers are seek-
ing a finer judgement that goes beyond a ‘hygiene’ level of quality, specialized 
expertise is often in demand to assist with evaluation. Harvey et al. (2000) pro-
posed that consumers assess the quality of an expert’s judgement based on that 
evaluator’s past performance and then use that judgement within their own deci-
sion-making process. Rather than using product attributes as the basis for decision 
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making, consumers tend to take expert opinion(s) as an overall representation of 
product attribute information upon which purchase decisions are based. Hirsch 
(1972) argues that in cultural industries the ability to evaluate is often based on 
knowledge of canon, which is an expert understanding of how a given object of 
evaluation fits into the wider context of works widely acknowledged to be of the 
highest quality. Canonical knowledge is often referenced in reviews in order to 
reinforce perceptions of expertise. Furthermore, Cameron (1995) suggests that 
critics in cultural industries seek to enhance their standing and status through the 
discovery and promotion of new talent. Parker received worldwide attention when 
he was the first to ‘call’ the 1982 vintage, when he recommended that his readers 
‘stock up on some sensational Bordeaux wines’ (McCoy, 2006: 102), which was at 
odds with the consensus opinion of many prominent critics at the time. Michelin 
claims to be the first guidebook to recognize the talents of Ferrán Adriá, the chef 
of the top-ranked El Bulli restaurant, and admits to following the careers of some 
promising chefs more closely than others. Wijnberg and Gemser (2000) described 
talent spotting as a symbiotic relationship in which the innovative producers and 
the experts who can establish the value of these innovations serve to legitimate one 
another. Thus for incumbent sellers, such judgements provide information about 
new competitors, who are provided with the opportunity to improve their position 
Figure 1 




























within the existing hierarchy. For consumers, this can provide: an opportunity to 
find high quality products and services at a lower price; the prospect of new expe-
riences; and kudos from fellow consumers that arise from their ‘discovery’.
Wijnberg describes expert selection as a process in which a ‘special evaluative 
capacity is attributed to a relatively small group of selectors who are not mem-
bers of the group in which the selection process takes place’ (1995: 223). Buyers 
expect a system of evaluation to be aligned with their own interests, which is to 
distinguish appropriate goods and services from inappropriate ones. However, an 
evaluator’s ability to be critical can be impaired when they are beneficiaries of 
producer largesse and have business relationships with these producers (Caves, 
2000), as is the case with evaluators who also function in market intermediary 
roles such as retailers and wholesalers. This ability to operate independently can be 
achieved through a number of means including subscriber support and sponsor-
ship. The Michelin Red Guide for example is subsidized as a loss leader to promote 
the corporate brand of the Michelin Tyre Corporation (Fabricant, 2005) and was 
the first guide to use, widely, independent inspectors with formal hotel and cater-
ing backgrounds who also paid for their own meals and accommodation, a break 
from the traditional custom of allowing journalists gratis meals with the expecta-
tion that media coverage would generate increased business (Chelminski, 2006). 
Parker, who sees himself as a consumer advocate, has arguably had a noticeable 
impact upon the profession of wine critics in terms of a new stress on the need for 
independence from producers and retailers (McCoy, 2006). Bradshaw (2007) sug-
gested that the FT’s legitimacy as an evaluator is in part due to its introduction of 
data audits and the redesign of questionnaires to aid the auditing process.
Evaluative innovation
At the core of any evaluative system is the actual methodology for producing 
 evaluative reviews. The methodology is often proprietary whether based on the 
complex and nuanced tacit knowledge of experts or on an elaborate compens-
atory algorithm (Blank, 2007). The real innovation is often one of format and 
presentation rather than a methodology that allows for evaluations that are more 
intelligible, decisive and critical. This is frequently done by supplementing or 
replacing qualitative descriptors with numerical ratings. In the 1930s, the Michelin 
Red Guide was the first restaurant guide to rate restaurants on the basis of food 
quality by producing the now famous three-star scale to denote relative excellence 
(Karpik, 2000). Parker was one of the first wine critics to use blunt and unequivo-
cal language to describe wines along with introduction of the now widely used 
100-point system for evaluating wines (Shapin, 2005). The FT introduced several 
innovations including the direct comparison of one-year European with two-year 
MBA American programmes and the inclusion of a range of metrics that favoured 
European schools that had staff and students that were more internationally diverse 
in composition (Wedlin, 2007).
A primary means through which evaluators create value lies in the perception 
that external evaluations can assist consumers in making decisions that are per-
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ceived as more rational and less bounded. Rather than using non-compensatory 
models in which a few alternatives are evaluated through relatively simple ‘rules 
of thumb’, individual consumers can find comfort in the perception that they can 
choose the ‘best’ among hundreds or thousands of alternatives, rather than the 
‘best’ among several ‘good enough’ alternatives arising through the search proc-
ess. The FT MBA 100 allows buyers to maximize their choice of a highly ranked 
school, given personal constraints such as budget, geographical preferences and 
entry requirements.
Input/output network
In order to be powerful, evaluators need to have a value-adding role within a net-
work of primary market actors. It is useful to conceive of an evaluator as a firm that 
procures raw inputs (evaluation data) from suppliers (producers), which it then 
processes (the system of evaluation) into a finished output (an evaluation), which 
it distributes through various channels to customers. Competitive advantage vis-à-
vis other evaluators resides not only with the evaluation production processes, but 
also in both the supply and distribution network. Evaluators achieve dominance 
by building networks that co-opt other market actors into assisting with procure-
ment and of distribution. Given the resources needed for the establishment and 
maintenance of such a network, this network can also serve as a barrier to other 
evaluators as well as increasing the evaluator’s compensatory comprehensiveness. 
A sponsor with ‘deep pockets’, such as the FT or the Michelin Corporation, can 
subsidize the cost of this network. The FT collects annual data from over 100 busi-
ness schools worldwide for their FT MBA 100 through a comprehensive survey 
that depends on the time-consuming co-operation of the respective programme 
managers and alumni, a proprietary asset that provides the FT with a source of 
competitive advantage against other league tables.
By contrast, the Times Good University Guide, although relatively influential 
among prospective undergraduate students, faces significant competition for 
audiences because of its dependence on non-proprietary data purchased from the 
UK Higher Education Statistics Agency, which allows other newspapers to eas-
ily produce competing league tables. While also highly influential within the US 
market, evaluative systems such as BusinessWeek’s ranking of business schools and 
US News & World Report’s ranking of undergraduate institutions, none occupy 
quite as dominant a position in their respective markets as the FT, which is in part 
because of their oligopoly control over evaluative information versus the FT’s near 
monopoly position in their respective evaluation markets. Although the Economist 
also publishes an annual worldwide ranking of MBA programmes, it has relatively 
little influence over buyers and producers in comparison to the FT, in part due to its 
reliance on information drawn from less extensive questionnaires, which European 
business schools take less seriously. A major, and perhaps more significant factor 
in the FT’s dominance is the formative role the FT has played in the creation of 
the market for European MBA programmes (Kwon, 2006), an issue we discuss 
 further below. The Michelin Red Guide fields an extensive network of restaurant/




hotel inspectors, each of whom travels 30,000 km; spends 150 nights in hotels; eats 
150 meals; and makes 800 open visits annually (Rogov, 2006). Arguably, restaurant 
critics for major newspapers such as the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times 
are also highly influential within their respective cities, but their influence is ulti-
mately bounded by the limited resources they possess as individual critics.
Dominant evaluators also depend on effective distribution systems consisting of 
the various media through which their evaluations are distributed. Evaluators with 
broad distribution through general publications such as the FT are likely to reach 
a larger audience and gain greater influence. That said, an evaluator whose media 
vehicle is better targeted at the intended audience, for example speciality publica-
tions such as the Wine Advocate, will be likely to have greater influence than one of 
equal size that is not narrowly targeted.
Evaluator market life cycle
The three moments of evaluator markets
In Figure 2, we illustrate the process through which a secondary evaluator market 
with a dominant evaluator can gain influence over a primary market. The life cycle 
of an evaluator market consists of three moments. We use the term ‘moments’ 
because they are not linear processes, but rather the interplay of overlapping and 
iterative activities that sporadically advances in fits and starts.
While some of the factors within each of the three moments may be characteris-
tic of evaluators that are not dominant, not all dominant evaluators have all these 
characteristic factors. Dominance is a relative rather than an absolute state. More 
characteristic factors increase the possibility of dominance through the various 
causal processes described in this paper. In analysing the three cases highlighted in 
this study, each of these evaluators developed through the various processes that 
constitute these three moments. The market changes brought about by the proc-
esses of each moment in turn, create tendencies for the development of the next. 
Failure in either of these moments does not necessarily destroy the viability of an 
evaluator, but does tend to impair their prospects for dominance by limiting their 
influence over primary market actors.
In the first moment, a primary market with some or all of the characteristics 
described in the first section and combined with rapid expansion creates a nascent 
demand for external evaluation. Parker’s rise to dominance, for instance coincided 
with a growing interest in wine – particularly the top-ranked Bordeaux growths 
– among increasingly affluent consumer segments in America (McCoy, 2006). 
The Michelin Red Guide’s rise to dominance was established during the decades 
of post-war recovery and expansion in which an affluent French bourgeoisie was 
able to indulge in consumer luxuries such as automobile-based tourism and haute 
cuisine restaurant meals (Chelminski, 2006). The FT MBA 100’s genesis occurred 
during a period of rapid expansion in the higher education sector (Anonymous, 
2000, 2002) and was aided by EU initiatives to ‘Europeanize’ management educa-
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tion (Wedlin, 2007). Informational asymmetries and resulting evaluative difficul-
ties created for primary actors by this rapid expansion in the first moment create a 
nascent demand for new forms of evaluation to address this problem.
The second moment occurs if and when an external evaluator decides to exploit 
this opportunity by introducing an evaluative innovation to address this nascent 
demand. If this evaluative innovation proves useful and therefore finds resonance 
with market actors, particularly consumers, a secondary evaluator market begins 
to form. We suggest that the ability of this evaluative innovation to find resonance 
among market actors is related to having some or all of the qualities related to 
specialized expertise, evaluative format and the input/output network. A failure to 
find broad resonance at this stage would likely result in an evaluator with a rela-
tively niche audience and therefore limited influence among actors in the primary 
market.
Similarly, the third moment commences if and when the various actors within 
the primary market begin to embed this external evaluation into their respective 
internal evaluation processes, which entrenches the external evaluator’s position of 
dominance. Once an innovation gains momentum as a result of finding an audi-
ence among enough buyers to tangibly influence patterns of market demand, then 
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producers, intermediaries and other actors will be forced to respond. This consists 
of moves by various market actors to embed the use of the evaluation into vari-
ous market selection processes beyond purchase decisions, which further serve to 
entrench the dominance of an evaluator. Entrenchment can be seen as an interplay 
between four distinct but interrelated second order effects including a multiplier 
effect, hierarchical contestation, genre and boundary work and identity forma-
tion.
Multiplier effect The evaluator network on the output side depends not only 
upon the distribution system to the direct audience but also on a multiplier effect, 
which creates a much larger indirect audience. By its very nature, evaluation is a 
form of intellectual property that is easily duplicable and redistributed. Producers, 
and intermediaries such as distributors and retailers, often use favourable reviews 
to promote products, resulting in a multiplier effect for evaluation where the even-
tual audience can be magnitudes of order higher than the direct audience (e.g. 
paid subscription). This multiplier effect is reinforced by word of mouth between 
consumers, where reviews of goods and services they have either encountered 
on a first-hand basis or indirectly received themselves through word of mouth. 
Given that negative reviews have little promotional value, another consequence 
of the multiplier effect is that good reviews tend to be more widely distributed 
– resulting in condition of asymmetric influence. Steinberger (2008) observes that 
American wine retailers commonly mark wines with Parker scores shelf cards, not 
only because his ratings help to move stock, but because they also allow retailers to 
substitute knowledgeable and trained staff with inexperienced lower-waged staff.
Another effect of the scores has been to open the market for Bordeaux fine wines 
to speculators. In 2006, the LivEx 100, which is composed of 100 top-ranked wines 
and is 91 per cent weighted to Bordeaux, was added to Bloomberg’s list of financial 
indices. The Liv-Ex, which only includes wines that are ranked at 95 points or bet-
ter, is effectively benchmarked using Parker scores. There are currently three major 
wine investment funds registered in the UK (Steinberger, 2007). Through these 
multiplication effects, Parker’s influence is much greater than the Wine Advocate’s 
direct circulation data would suggest.
Similarly, the process of multiplication has been a significant factor in entrench-
ing the dominance of the FT over the market for MBA programmes. Due to ways 
in which the general public tends to conflate reductive measures such as business 
schools’ MBA rankings or research assessment ratings (Kwon, 2006), the FT MBA 
100 ranking has become a crucial factor in many marketing strategies, with a good 
FT ranking creating a ‘halo’ effect that helps to promote other programmes and 
activities. Bradshaw (2007) noted that in 2006, 96 of 100 schools ranking in the FT 
MBA 100 made reference to their ranking on their websites.
Hierarchical contestation Rankings can provide an arena to challenge the exist-
ing market hierarchy by enabling the mobility of middle-ranked market competi-
tors (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001) and providing visibility for the lowest ranks 
(Wedlin, 2006). Evaluators can also play a powerful role in determining outcomes 
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of contested boundaries by deciding who or what to evaluate, thereby including 
or excluding producers from consideration by many buyers. The FT has been a 
significant factor in the broadening of the field of management education through 
its extensive coverage of non-US MBA programmes. Prior to the creation of the FT 
MBA 100, European management schools were effectively marginalized by exclu-
sion from BusinessWeek’s MBA rankings. To its credit, the FT has, arguably, used 
its influence to extend rather than restrict the boundaries of the market to new 
entrants, with coverage having been extended to programmes in China, Eastern 
Europe, India and Russia over the past few years (Bradshaw, 2007). Lavelle, the 
business education editor for BusinessWeek, argues that his magazine’s league table 
allows for the promotion of previously underrated schools on their performance 
outside of employability statistics and starting salaries – measures that tend to 
favour wealthy and highly ranked business schools with large alumni networks 
(2006). In the field of haute cuisine, consumers and producers have come to regard 
the Michelin Red Guide as the primary authority and legitimator, providing aspir-
ing chefs with a forum in which to elevate their relative positions and in doing so 
derive status, celebrity and fortunes.
Genre Evaluators often classify a product or service according to genre. The 
 designation of a film as belonging to the comedy genre implicitly brings forth an 
evaluative template – consisting of implicit or explicit evaluative criteria – based 
upon previous experiences of films belonging to that genre. Failure to be classified 
and evaluated in an appropriate genre can result in a producer being ruled out of 
consideration by consumers (Shocker et al., 1991; Urban et al., 1996). Given the 
influence that critical attention can have on the success of a producer (Zuckerman, 
1999), Hsu (2006) argues that critics will tend to favour arenas or genres where 
they have developed clear and structured schemas for evaluation, thereby provid-
ing disproportionately greater attention to producers of those genres. Producers 
will tend to adapt their offerings to the perceived evaluator preferences that they 
believe constitute the evaluative template, a behaviour that alters supply character-
istics to further reinforce the first order demand shifts created by buyers respond-
ing to the evaluator – an effect observed in neo-institutional studies of the fields of 
haute cuisine (Rao et al., 2003; Durand et al., 2007); European MBA programmes 
(Wedlin, 2006, 2007) and in the wine industry (Hsu et al., 2007). Through their 
ability to influence buyer demand and producer supply, established evaluators 
often have the power to define or redefine these templates, sometimes leading to 
the creation of new genres.
An example of this is the phenomenon of wine producers responding to 
Parker’s perceived personal preferences – the ‘Parkerization’ of wine as it has been 
dubbed – which has been blamed for a broad shift among wine producers, often 
with the help of ‘flying winemaker’ consultants, towards a generic style that is 
more acidic, riper and heavily oaked with higher alcohol content (Shapin, 2005). 
Gioia and Corley (2002) argued that MBA rankings force schools into allocating 
greater resources to managing a school’s reputation and diverting them from 
core activities such as teaching and research. 




Identity formation While it is easy to reduce the cause and effect of this process of 
adaptation to explanations of shifts in consumer demand followed by an adaptation 
in producer supply, this rationalistic perspective fails to explain the extent of the 
power of these systems and the nature of their embeddedness. Evaluation systems 
act upon producers to force cultural factors such as identity and esteem into align-
ment with structural material self-interest. Elsbach and Kramer (1996) document-
ed how the staff of business schools that achieved a higher than expected ranking 
in the BusinessWeek MBA Rankings would re-evaluate their identities and upwardly 
adjust their ambitions, while the staff of schools that performed worse than aver-
age would adjust their ambitions downwards toward excellence in more narrow 
disciplinary and/or geographical boundaries rather than broader national excel-
lence in all areas. Martins (2005) found that the greater the discrepancy between a 
Dean’s perception of their institution’s relative standing and its overall league table 
ranking, the more likely they were to undertake organizational change.
A similar relationship between culture and structure can be found within the 
field of haute cuisine. Unlike the 10, 20 and 30-point scales used by other guides, 
and which tend to fluctuate from year to year, the Michelin Red Guide’s three-tier 
star system in which promotions and demotions are far less frequent, takes on the 
quality of an earned rank or distinction and thus is crucial to the process of iden-
tity formation of chefs who are awarded Michelin stars. Recent research reveals 
that non-food factors such as ambience and location play a statistically relevant 
role in the final evaluation, lending support to the claim of some chefs that the 
winning and maintaining of a Michelin star ranking entails huge investment in 
capital and staff (Gergaud et al., 2007). Haute cuisine restaurants are among the 
least profitable segments of the catering trade. In response, many Michelin starred 
chefs have sought to leverage their reputations by expanding into peripheral activi-
ties such as TV shows, cookbooks, mid-range restaurants and ready-to-eat meals, a 
development that may be driven not only by economic necessity but also ambition 
(Chossat, 2007).
The normalization of heterogeneity
As argued above, the phenomenon of evaluator dominance can be reduced to 
 neither structural nor cultural explanatory perspectives and defies simple interpre-
tation through the inferred causality of predominantly qualitative methods. Rather, 
what is required is a constructive synthesis of all three of these approaches.
We posit that evaluator dominance is the outcome of the self-reinforcing sub-
processes of the third moment. An evaluative innovation becomes a focus of 
activity in which various market actors begin a dynamic process of the enacting 
and contesting of reputational hierarchies, driven by a powerful combination of 
material interest and identity formation processes. In response to buyers adapting 
their preferences to correspond to the dominant evaluator’s evaluative schema, 
producers pursue deliberate strategies such as reclassification of a product into 
a genre where it is more likely to be evaluated positively and lobby evaluators 
to review their product. If a certain genre becomes increasingly popular among 
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buyers, evaluators may shift attention to evaluation of that genre. This three-way 
interaction between evaluators, producers and consumers is a process that can 
redefine market boundaries and establish a network of market actors centred on 
an increasingly entrenched evaluator whose evaluations are now integral to their 
previously completely internalized evaluation processes. The three moments of 
evaluator dominance can also be conceptualized as a Foucauldian process in which 
a previously heterogeneous market becomes increasingly normalized for consum-
ers, producers, market intermediaries and the evaluator themselves. An evaluator’s 
dominance comes not from the arbitrary imposition of their evaluation upon 
other market actors, but rather because their innovation becomes the catalyst for 
the formation of a new ‘taken for granted’ reality for other market actors through 
the third moment. Thus, the entrenchment of an evaluator is rarely the result of 
the conscious and wholesale readjustment of the evaluative schemas of any sin-
gle group of market actors, but rather it occurs through a series of gradual and 
iterative shifts by market actors towards a schema largely defined by the dominant 
evaluator’s system of evaluation.
Conclusion
In addressing the two research questions that began this paper (What are the prima-
ry market characteristics that create a propensity for evaluator dominance and what 
are the processes through which this dominance emerges?), we begin to provide 
conceptual insight into the role of evaluators and the nature of their evaluation sys-
tems. This provides us with a starting point for a more substantial research agenda 
on the phenomenon of market evaluation – an agenda that could be based on the 
following three questions: (i) How do evaluators actually evaluate? (ii) How are 
primary market actors influenced by evaluations in actual practice? and (iii) What 
if anything can these market actors actually do about this dominance?
Despite the power wielded by these dominant evaluators, we still know little 
about the actual practice of evaluation. We suggest that the first question can be 
addressed through a series of ethnographic case studies of evaluators. How do the 
editorial practices that produce an annual evaluation such as the FT MBA 100 for 
example differ from what a Michelin inspector does on a daily basis? How are they 
similar?
We also know little about how the decisions of consumers, intermediaries and 
producers are influenced by external evaluation. Much extant work on consumer 
and managerial decision making has been conducted in artificial environments 
such as laboratories, computer simulations and other controlled situations that are 
removed from the complexity of the real world. Further investigations could use-
fully be informed by research in areas such as naturalistic decision making, which 
deals with how decisions are made by individuals in natural environments operat-
ing under real-time constraints.
The final question suggests a further three lines of enquiry. First, what are the 
strategies that are consciously employed by evaluators to reinforce and increase 




their dominance over primary markets and competition from other evaluators? 
Second, what tactics and counter-strategies can market actors utilize to resist and 
undermine the power of these evaluators? Finally, what are the factors that deter-
mine the relative endurance or longevity of these evaluative regimes? A particularly 
fruitful avenue of enquiry that converges these three lines of questioning would be 
the study of hybrid internet-based evaluation aggregators that combine the func-
tions of external aggregator and market intermediary.
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